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Abstract
In this paper we study possible rankings  of opportunity  profiles. An opportunity profile is a list of sets
of alternative opportunities, one set for each agent in the society. We compare such opportunity profiles
on the basis of the notion of “equality of opportunities”. Our main results show the necessary and
sufficient conditions for this comparison to be made using exclusively the information provided by two
cardinal measures: the number of common alternatives for all sets in a given profile and/or the difference
between the number of alternatives of individual sets. We also show that, under given circumstances,
the only way to solve conflicts between these two numbers is to combine them in a lexicographic
procedure.
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21. INTRODUCTION.
There have been in recent times several attempts to study the notion of “equality of opportunities”
through comparisons of the opportunity sets available to the members of a given society. That is, a
social situation is represented by a profile of opportunity sets, one for each individual in that society.
Our aim is to find reasonable ways of comparing any two social situations by looking at the two induced
opportunity profiles. Our main concern will be the notion of equality of opportunities within this general
framework.
The nature of the elements within each set of opportunities is open to a variety of interpretations. By
the standards of economic theory, they can be understood as available consumption baskets for the
consumer or feasible production plans for the producer. But they may also be interpreted, for example,
as different primary goods as in Rawls (1971), different functionings as in Sen (1985), or as basic
liberties and civil or political rights of the population as in Ok (1997).
We do not adscribe this work to any particular interpretation of the alternatives, but it may be of some
help to look upon them as any kind of mutually exclusive opportunities, one of which will be the agent’s
final choice. This is an interpretation assumed by many works in the literature on “freedom of choice”
and “preference for flexibility” (see for example, Arlegi and Nieto (1997), Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu
(1994), Gravel (1998), Kreps (1979), Neme, Nieto y Quintas (1996), Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Puppe
(1996) or Sen (1991) among others). This interpretation is also present in other works devoted, like this
one, to the notion of equality of opportunities, such as Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1996).
Some authors, such as Thomson (1994) or Kranich (1995), propose the study of equality of
opportunities on the basis of individual preferences over the alternatives included in opportunity sets.
But, on the other hand, there could be a problem of “adaptative preferences” posed by Elster (1982).
3Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de Gaer (1996), and Herrero (1997) start with the assumption of a social
ranking, R, on the alternatives, and the goal is to obtain rankings of profiles on the basis of that social
ranking R. In Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto (1998) this social ranking, R, is induced from a
ranking on “uniform profiles”; that is, profiles where every individual has the same opportunity set. In
this work we follow the approach of Kranich (1996), Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto (1995), and
also Ok and Kranich (1998), in which the opportunity sets are evaluated only by the number of
alternatives in each set (its cardinality). Our main concern will be the notion of equality of opportunities,
leaving aside other considerations such as Pareto efficiency, for instance. This idea will be reflected by
the axioms which will be presented as desirable properties of the social preference relation over the
opportunity profiles.
Among the rules based on the use of sets cardinality, there are two main principles to evaluate
equality in opportunity profiles. One takes into account the difference between the opportunity sets of the
richest and the poorest members of society. The second one is based on the similarity between individual
opportunity sets. According to the first principle, if the number of opportunities is more or less similar
across individuals, then we say that there is more equality of opportunities. According to the second
principle, we would like to focus on the number of opportunities commonly shared by all the
individuals, and this number would be a reasonable measure of the equality of opportunities of a given
profile.
These two principles have been translated into two criteria for ranking opportunity profiles. One
seeks to minimize differences between the number of opportunities as in Kranich (1996), and the other
to maximize the cardinality of the intersection of all individual opportunity sets as in Herrero, Iturbe-
Ormaetxe and Nieto (1995).
Kranich (1996) shows several examples in which the situation improves according to the difference
criterion only at the cost of worsening (reducing) the common opportunities. A very relevant question is
then how to combine the two cardinality-based criteria. One aim of this paper is to provide an answer to
the question of what the reasonable trade-off will be between the two rules.
4The plan of the paper goes as follows: In Section 2 we introduce notation and definitions. Section 3 is
devoted to the axiomatic structure of the two cardinality-based criteria. In Section 4 we present some
examples of paradoxical results from the isolated use of both criteria. We find that, under some given
assumptions, the only way to solve such paradoxes is by mixing the two numerical criteria in a
lexicographic procedure. All the results corresponding to sections 1 to 4 have been obtained for the two-
person case. In Section 5 we present a possible generalization for the n-person case, and Section 6
contains some final conclusions
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS.
Let N={1,...,n} denote the set of agents, and let X be an infinite set of opportunities. We denote the
set of finite subsets of X by L. An opportunity set for agent i is an element Ai ˛ L. We consider profiles
of opportunity sets of the form A=[A1,...,An] ˛ Ln.
For A=[A1,..., An] ˛ Ln, s (A) denotes a permutation of À  such that #A s (1) ‡ #A s (2) ‡ ··· ··· ‡ #A s (n). We









. A–i  will denote the (n–1)-
dimensional profile {A1,..., Ai–1, A i+1, ..., An}
Let us denote by $⊂LnXLn any transitive and reflexive binary relation defined on Ln. As we know,
@ defined for A,B ˛ L by: A@B if A$B and ¬(B$A), where ¬ denotes logical negation, is the
asymmetric part of $, and ~ is an equivalence relation. ‡ L will denote the lexicographic order on ´ n.
We investigate preferences over profiles of opportunity sets in terms of equality of opportunities. In
that sense, for A,B ˛ Ln we write A@B, meaning the profile A is more equitable than B . $ and ~ are
5read as “at least as equitable as” and “as equitable as” respectively. In Section 3 and 4 we investigate
rankings on L2, and in Section 5 we generalize our result for n agents.
3. CARDINAL DIFFERENCE AND NUMBER OF COMMON OPPORTUNITIES A S
EQUALITY FACTORS.
In Kranich (1996) the Cardinality Difference Relation on profiles of opportunity sets ($CD) is
defined by: " A,B ˛ L2, A$CDB if CD(A) £ CD(B), where " A ˛ L2, CD(A)= # #A A1 2− .
This ordering reflects the principle which identifies equality of opportunities with equality of the
number of opportunities, and reaches its maximum when all of the agents enjoy the same number of
opportunities.
On the other hand, there exists the idea of identifying equality of opportunities with all agents having
the same opportunities; this idea finds a natural representation in the criterion Common Opportunity
Relation, ($c) which appears in Kranich (1996), Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto (1998) and in
Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de Gaer (1996), its definition being: A$cB if #A ˙ ‡ #B ˙  (in the case n=2, if
#(A1 ∩A2) ‡ #(B1 ∩B2)).
As said before, $CD and $c are the two orderings with a cardinality basis. In general, they lead to
solutions which are different, and, as we will show later, sometimes mutually contradictory. That is
why we want first to focus our attention on those rankings of profiles which are consistent with both
rules, and for this we propose the following axioms:
6Axioms
ANONYMITY (AN)
" A=[A1, A2] ˛ L2, A~[A2, A1]
MONOTONICITY (MON)
" A ˛ L2 , " x ˛ X,  s (A)$[A s (1), A s (2)\{x}], with strict preference if x ˛ (A1 ∩A2).
ASSIMILATION (ASM)
" A ˛ L2, " x,y1,y2 ˛ X  s.t. x ˛ X\A ¨ , y1 ˛ A1 and y2 ˛ A2, [A1 ¨ {x}\{y1}, A2 ¨ {x}\{y2}]$A
INDEPENDENCE OF DISJOINT EXPANSIONS (IDE)
" A ˛ L2, " x,y ˛ X\A ¨ , x ≠ y, [A1 ¨ {x}, A2 ¨ {y}]~A
(AN) is a minimal condition in fairness and distributive justice, and says that it is only the distribution
of opportunity sets among agents that matters, not their names. (ASM) appears in Kranich (1996), and
implies that the substitution of any two opportunities (one for each individual) in a given profile with a
common one, will not cause detriment. (MON) requires that dropping an opportunity from the set of the
worst-off, will not increase the equality of opportunities (which strictly decreases when such an
opportunity was common to both). (IDE) says that increasing the number of opportunities for all (both)
agents with new non-common opportunities will not affect the degree of equality. It is very clear that
(IDE) goes against the notion of Pareto efficiency, but makes sense from a strictly egalitarian approach.
(IDE) implies the property of “Replacing” (REP) used in Herrero, Iturbe–Ormaetxe and Nieto (1998):
" A ˛ L2, " x,y ˛ X such that x ˇ A ¨ , y ˛ A1\A2, then [A1 ¨ {x}\{y},A2]~A.
Proof: Let z ˛ X\A ¨  s.t. z „ x,y. By (IDE) [A1 ¨ {x}\{y},A2]~[(A1 ¨ {x}\{y}) ¨ {y},A2 ¨ {z}], and also
by (IDE) A~[A1 ¨ {x}, A2 ¨ {z}]. Then by transitivity A~[A1 ¨ {x}\{y}, A2].
7Notice that the inverse implication is not true: let $ defined by: A$B if #A ¨ ‡ ‡‡‡ #B ¨ . This relation
is transitive, and satisfies (REP), but not (IDE).
 A Characterization Theorem
THEOREM 1. Let $ be a complete ordering defined on L2; then $ satisfies (AN), (MON), (ASM)
and (IDE) if and only if:
" A,B ˛ L2, [#A ˙ ‡ #B ˙  and CD(A) £ CD(B)] fi  A$B and
[#A ˙ >#B ˙  and CD(A)<CD(B)] fi  A@B
(and hence [#A ˙ =#B ˙  and CD(A)=CD(B)] fi  A~B).
(Proof of Theorem 1 available upon request).
Theorem 1 states that under the axiomatic conditions, the ranking will always verify the dominance
principle described by the two implications of the theorem. In other words, the proposed axiomatic
structure constrains the rankings to those based on the common opportunities cardinal and/or the cardinal
difference, weighting up the first factor positively and the second one negatively. This implies, for
example, that no other factor apart from these two, such as the total sum of opportunities, is
determinating in evaluating the equality of opportunities. The class of orderings characterized in
Theorem 1 represents a reasonable set of rules in a context of cardinal evaluation of the opportunities.
Indeed, $CD and $c are members of this family of rankings and so are several possible combinations
of the two (in a lexicographic procedure, for instance). But there are also in the literature many criteria
which are not members of the characterized class. For example, in Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto
(1995,1998), the following orderings over profiles of opportunities are defined:
8Lexmin Cardinality Relation  ($lm): " A,B ˛ L2, A$lmB if [A s (2),A s (1)] ‡ L [B s (2),B s (1)]
Maxmin Opportunity Relation ($m): " A,B ˛ L2, A$mB if [#A ˙ ,# A s (2)] ‡ L  [#B ˙ ,# B s (2)]
Lexmin Opportunity Utilitarian Relation ($lu): " A,B ˛ L2, A$luB if [#A ˙ ,#A ¨ ] ‡ L [#B ˙ ,#B ¨ ]
Lexmin Opp. Relation ($lo): " A,B ˛ L2, A$loB if [#A ˙ ,#A s (2),#A s (1)] ‡ L [#B ˙ ,#B s (2),#B s (1)]
Bossert, Fleuerbay and Van de Gaer (1996) also define the following:
Maxmin Cardinality Relation ($min): " A,B ˛ L2, A$minB if # A s (2) ‡ # B s (2)
The above orderings combine in different ways notions of equality of opportunities with some
Paretian considerations. It is easy to check that all of these orderings fail precisely in the axiom (IDE).
Other interesting orderings of opportunity profiles defined in Kranich (1996), also violate some of the
axioms. For example:
Let, " A ˛ L2,  maxd(A)=max{#(A1\A2), #(A2\A1)}, and mind(A)=min{#(A1\A2), #(A2\A1)}, we define:
A$maxdB if maxd(A) £ maxd(B)
A$mindB if mind(A) ‡ mind(B)
A$mmB if (mind(A),maxd(B)) ‡ L (mind(B),maxd(A))
4. LEXICOGRAPHIC COMBINATIONS
The two previous criteria for ranking opportunity profiles might be the object of criticism. If we take
into account only the Cardinality Difference ordering, then there could be two profiles A,B  such that
9#A1 = #A2 = #B1 = #B2, but A1 „ A2 and B1 ≡  B2. In this example there are reasons to accept profile B as
being more egalitarian than A, which would suggest the need to measure in some way the opportunities
shared by all the agents.
On the other hand, the use of the cardinality of the intersection as the unique criterion by which to
rank profiles in terms of equality may also lead to some counterintuitive results. Let A be the case
#A1=#A2 = 2 and A1 ≡ A2, then A would be indifferent to a profile B such that #B1=4, #B2 = 2, and
B2 ⊂B1. This example would have a satisfactory solution taking into account the Cardinality Difference.
The above examples lead us to consider combinations of the two measures as equality rankings. Now
we present some possible combined rankings, always under the domain of Theorem 1, that is, verifying
the axioms in Section 3:
Let us consider the following rankings, $1 and $2, which are lexicographic combinations of the
cardinality-based criteria:
" A,B ˛ L2, A$1B if [#A ˙ ,–CD(A)] ‡ L[#B ˙ ,–CD(B)]
A$2B if [–CD(A),#A ˙ ] ‡ L[–CD(B),#B ˙ ]
These criteria solve the conflicts between the two measures in a very similar way to $CD and $c
respectively, since they always prioritize one of the factors over the other. Hence the kind of objections
we may find are quite similar: for example, from a profile where both agents had the same opportunity
set, if we were to increase one set with an additional however large, X; and the other with a sole element
x ˛ X, this modification would improve the profile according to $1, which seems to be counterintuitive.
On the other hand, let us imagine a profile with an empty intersection and a big cardinal difference, and
let us suppose that we increase the small set with an additional however large set, X, while increasing the
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bigger opportunity set with an additional set X ¨ {x}: this would produce a worse profile according to
$CD and $2, which in some contexts could also result counterintuitive.










Let a,b ˛ ´ +, " A,B ˛ L
2
,  A$4B if [a(#A ˙ )–b(CD(A)] ‡ [a(#B ˙ )–b(CD(B)]
The first ranking weights up the number of common opportunities while weighting down the cardinal
difference, and also nicely relativizes changes in both values when a conflict arises. However,
sometimes this ranking can be arbitrary: for example, if we add to the bigger set a new opportunity
which is included in the smaller set, this modification could be better (when the number of common
opportunities is smaller than the cardinal difference), or worse (in the contrary case).
$4 represents a class of rankings parametrized by a and b, and combines both measures as a
sum. The values of a and b could, to some extent, reflect the weight given to each measure, and
hence, determine the degree to which one prevails over the other (whenever there is no domination).
But this measure might also be arbitrary: when we give “b/a” additional opportunities to the richer
agent -if that number is not entire, we take the first whole after “b/a”- then,  the new situation is
equally or more egalitarian.
Apart from $3 and $4 it is also possible to think about other non-lexicographic combinations of the
two numerical criteria, which also are within the domain of Theorem 1, such as the following:
A$5B if A$CD B when #A ˙ , #B ˙  <k, and A$c B when #A ˙  or #B ˙  ‡  k
A$6B if A$c B when #A ˙ , #B ˙ <k, and A$CD B when #A ˙  or #B ˙  ‡  k
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(where k  is a fixed natural number).
These solutions could be appropriate in certain contexts but they clearly become arbitrary if we wish
to apply them as general rules of equality.
In short, if we want to present a rule which combines both principles, it must provide an answer to
such questions as: when is a greater number of common opportunities able to compensate big
differences in the number of opportunities; at which point can we say that a similar number of
opportunities is more equitable, despite a smaller number of common opportunities; and other similar
questions. We have seen how none of the proposed criteria can elude having to look for the solution in a
specific direction, and how there is always a degree of arbitrariness in the solution they propose; as a
consequence, we can always find an objection to each rule. It is, therefore, worth posing the following
question: Is it possible to find an overall, coherent and satisfactory solution to the conflicts between the
two cardinal measures? We will now propose two axioms which impose additional properties of
consistency in order to come closer to answering this question:
CONSISTENCY (C) " A,B ˛ L2, " x ˛ X\( A1 ¨ B1) such that:
(i): x ˛ A2iff x ˛ B2; and (ii): #A1 ‡ #A2  iff #B1 ‡ #B2
then [A1, A2 ] $ [B1, B2 ] « [ A1 ¨ {x}, A2 ] $ [B1 ¨ {x}, B2 ]
NON DECISIVENESS (ND) " A=[A1, A2] ˛ L2 , #A1 ‡ #A2,
" C1,C2˛ L such that C1˙ A1=˘ ; C2˙ A2=˘ ; and #C1>#C2,
" x˛ X\( A ¨ ¨ C1¨ C2); then
[A1 ¨ C1, A2 ¨ C2,...,An ¨ Cn]$A  « «««   [A1 ¨ C1 ¨ {x}, A2 ¨ C2,..., An ¨ Cn]$A
 (C) deals with the rule that certain expansions, which are similar for both profiles, leave the previous
preference between them unaffected. (ND) imposes a certain coherence in the ordering on opportunity
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profiles: if an increase in the cardinality difference is not negative from the social viewpoint, then neither
is any additional increase with one new opportunity.
Theorem 1 was to show how, under given conditions, no more than the two numerical measures are
necessary and sufficient to evaluate the equality of opportunities. The following theorem shows that,
under certain consistency conditions, the only way to combine the two measures is through a
lexicographic procedure:
THEOREM 2. Let $ be an ordering on L2, $ satisfies (AN), (MON), (ASM), (IDE), (C) and (ND) if
and only if $ ˛ {$CD,$c,$1,$2}.
(Proof of Theorem 2 available upon request)
Theorem 2 can be interpreted in the following sense: given the meaning of coherency expressed by
axioms (C) and (ND), the only coherent way to combine the two cardinal measures is through a
lexicographic procedure. Although Theorem 2 is not formally an impossibility theorem, it could also be
interpreted in that sense: If we want to preserve the coherence given by axioms (C) and (ND), we must
fall into the arbitrariness which underlies the lexicographic solutions, or we must ignore one of the
measures.
5. THE n-AGENTS CASE
There are many different ways to generalize the two basic cardinal measures used here. Each of them
could be more or less appropriate according to the context in which the equality of opportunities is to be
analyzed. In the case of the number of common opportunities, one possible formula is the cardinal of the
intersection of the n sets in the profile (see Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto (1998), and Bossert,
Fleuerbaey and Van de Gaer (1996)), however, in contexts where these sets tend to be very different,
the intersection may very frequently be empty, and the measure may become non-functional. We could
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then think of other measures, such as the sum of the number of common opportunities, taken two by
two; the maximal (minimal) number of common opportunities between two sets; the intersection between
the bigger and the smaller set of opportunities, and others.
The cardinality difference is also susceptible to different generalizations. See, for example, Kranich
(1996), who provides a mean of the cardinal differences between sets taken two by two. We could also
think of another simpler measure, such as the cardinal difference between the bigger and the smaller set.
Obviously, the type of axiomatic generalization is closely linked to the two respective generalized
measures that one decides to adopt. We propose here one possible generalization on the basis of the
number of the common opportunities in the n sets of the profile; that is, for A˛ Ln, we will consider A ˙ .
On the other hand, we will use the cardinality difference between the bigger and the smaller set in each
profile; that is, " A ˛ Ln, we will consider CDn(A)=max(#Ai)–min(#Ai).  According to this, the
definitions of the criteria described in the preceding sections can immediately be extended to the n-agents
case, in particular, we will define the orderings $cg, $CDg, $1g and $2g respectively by:
" A,B ˛ Ln, A$cgB if #A ˙ ‡  #B ˙
" A,B ˛ Ln, A$CDgB if CDn(A) £ CDn(B)
" A,B ˛ Ln, A$1gB if [# A ˙ ,–CDn(A)] ‡ L[# B ˙ ,–CDn(B)]
" A,B ˛ Ln, A$2gB if [–CDn(A),# A ˙ ] ‡ L[–CDn(B),# B ˙ ]
Generalized axioms.
ANONYMITY (ANg)
" A ˛ Ln , A~ s (A).
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Applying (AN g), we can suppose without loss of generality that " A ˛ Ln, it is presented in cardinal
order, that is A= s (A). We will do so from this point on.
MONOTONICITY (MONg)
" A ˛ Ln , " x ˛ A i (i „ 1), s (A)$[ A s (1),..., A s (i)\{x},..., A s (n)]
with strict preference if x˛ A ˙ and i=n
ASSIMILATION (ASMg)
" A ˛ Ln, A=[A1, A2,..., An], " x ˛ X\A ¨ , " y ˛ A1XA2X...XAn
[A1 ¨ {x}\{y1}, A2 ¨ {x}\{y2},..., An ¨ {x}\{yn}]$A
INDEPENDENCE OF DISJOINT EXPANSIONS (IDEg)
" A ˛ Ln such that [#A1 ‡ #A2 ‡ ... ‡ #An],
" x ˛ Xn such that: (i) xi ≠ xj " i,j=1,...,n; (ii): x1 ˛ A1 « xn ˛ An;
(iii): " i, #(A1 ¨ {x1}) ‡ #(Ai ¨ {xi }) ‡ #(An ¨ {xn}); and (iv): " i , xi ˇ (A–i) ˙
then [A1 ¨ {x1}, A2 ¨ {x2},..., An ¨ {xn}]~A
CONSISTENCY (Cg)
" A,B ˛ Ln, " Aj ˛ A, Bj ˛ B, " x ˛ X\(Aj ¨ Bj) such that:






















A$B  « [ A1,..., Aj ¨ {x},..., An] $  [B1,..., Bj ¨ {x},..., Bn]
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NON-DECISIVENESS (NDg)
" A ˛ Ln such that [#A1 ‡ #A2 ‡ ... ‡ #An], " Ci˛ L (i=1,...,n) such that Ai ˙ Ci= ˘  " i, and such that
#C1>#Cn;  and " x˛ X\( A ¨ ¨ (∪ =in 1Ci)); then
[A1 ¨ C1, A2 ¨ C2,...,An ¨ Cn]$A  « «««   [A1 ¨ C1 ¨ {x}, A2 ¨ C2,..., An ¨ Cn]$A
All axioms belong to the possible generalizations of the corresponding axioms in the two agents case.
As then, it is possible to derive from (IDEg) the following generalized axiom (REPg): " A ˛ Ln, " Ai ˛ A,
" x,y s.t. x ˛ X\A ¨ , y ˛ Ai\(A–i) ˙ , [A 1,..., Ai ¨ {x}\{y},..., An]~A. The proof of the relation between
(IDEg) and (REPg) is quite similar to the n=2 case.
THEOREM 1 ¢ . Let $ be a complete ordering defined on Ln; then $ satisfies (ANg), (MONg), (ASMg)
and (IDEg) if and only if:
" A,B ˛ L2, [#A ˙ ‡ #B ˙  and CDn(A) £ CDn(B)] fi  A$B and
[#A ˙ >#B ˙  and CDn(A)<CDn(B)] fi  A@B
(and hence [#A ˙ =#B ˙  and CDn(A)=CDn(B)] fi  A~B).
THEOREM 2 ¢ . Let $ be an ordering on Ln, $ satisfies (ANg), (MONg), (ASMg), (IDEg), (Cg) and
(NDg) if and only if $ ˛ {$CDg , $cg , $1g, $2g}.
(Proof of Theorems 1 ¢  and 2¢  available upon request).
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